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Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
The Rising Prominence of Domestic Politics
Key Hypotheses
- As far as Polish and German strategic foreign policy objectives are con-
cerned, the German-Polish relationship and the enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union to the East are interdependent. After the end of Communism
in East Central Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Poland and Ger-
many discovered a ‘community of interests’.
1 This notion was based on
the assumption of Poland’s future EU membership.
- Currently, the process of EU enlargement has entered the stage of for-
mal negotiations. The implications of this development for German-Polish
relations are twofold. Firstly, the success of the accession process and
subsequently the condition of the Polish-German relationship has become
more dependent upon progress in all areas of Germany’s and Poland’s
European diplomacy. Secondly, the relationship has been exposed to the
influence of a larger group of domestic agents, some of which are not so
concerned about strategic foreign policy objectives.
- Germany’s current European policy prioritisation and domestic devel-
opments in both countries are slowing down the EU enlargement process
1 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Polen und Deutschland in Europa an der Schwelle des
21. Jahrhunderts', in: H.A. Jackobsen, M.Tomala, (Hrsg.) Bonn-Warschau 1945-
1991. Die Deutsch-Polnischen Beziehungen. Analyse und Dokumentation , Verlag
Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1992, pp. 518-523.Marcin Zaborowski
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with consequences for Polish-German relations. However, both countries
strategic objectives - to complete the process of unifying Europe, remain
unchallenged.
Introduction
The principle of EU Enlargement is largely accepted by political elites on
both sides of the Oder.
2 The Polish government declared in its official
document- the National Strategy for Integration, that achieving EU mem-
bership figures amongst its chief priorities.
3 Successive German govern-
ments have also underpinned the notion of Eastern expansion of the EU,
as well as supporting further developments in relations with Poland in the
context of European integration.
4
It seems that after centuries of struggle to assert their geopolitical posi-
tion, Poland and Germany have agreed that their security will be better
achieved when both countries are members of the same Western struc-
tures. The importance by Polish-German rapprochement for completing
the process of ‘United Europe’ was pronounced in numerous declarations
of German and Polish statesmen.
5 It was even envisaged that as far as the
notion of European integration is concerned, the relationship should per-
2  See: Danuta Zagrodzka, Stare Leki Nowe Strachy, ‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, 7.12.98.
This article analysis the recent opinion polls comparing the German and Polish
elites. The research was initiated by the Centre for International Relations, War-
saw.
3  See: National Strategy for Integration, Committee for European Integration, Ja-
nuary 15, 1999.
4  See: H.A. Jackobsen, M.Tomala, ibid. Also: Coalition Agreement between the
SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens signed in Bonn on October 20,1998.
5  See the relevant collection of bilateral documents in: Jackobsen, M.Tomala, ibid.
Jan Barcz , Mieczyslaw Tomala (eds.), Polska-Niemcy, Dobre Sasiedztwo i
Przyjazna Wspolpraca, Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, Warszawa
1992.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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form a role comparable with the Franco-German axis.
6 This continuing
German support for Poland’s West European aspirations has facilitated
the current condition of German-Polish relations which has often been
described as better than in any other point in history.
On the other hand, since the second half of 1998, the atmosphere in Pol-
ish-German relations has deteriorated somewhat. The reasons for this re-
gression have almost always been connected to the issue of EU Enlarge-
ment. Initially, it was the question of property rights concerning Western
Polish real estate which had been German before the war.
7 Subsequently,
the new German SPD/Green government raised some skepticism con-
cerning the EU Enlargement timetable and appealed for a ‘new realism’
in addressing the issue.
8 In Warsaw both these policy statements were re-
ceived emotionally and with a fair amount of disappointment. Questions
were asked whether Germany had altered its policy towards Poland and
what kind of consequences such a development would present for Po-
land’s hopes for becoming a member of the EU.
9
This chapter argues that with the EU Enlargement process approaching its
decisive phase, Polish-German co-operation is becoming more intense
6  See: Friedbert Pflüger, 'Polen-Unser Frankreich im Osten', in: W. Schäuble/
R.Seiters (Hgg.) Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Die Thesen der Jungen Au-
ßenpolitiker, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1996.
7  The Federation of Ethnic Germans expelled from the territories presently belon-
ging to Poland argues that as long as Poland does not fulfil the restitution claims
of former German landowners, it is not fit to join the EU. In the run-up to the
German 1998 general election, Bavarian CSU and a part of the CDU supported
these demands. On 29 May 1998, the coalition of CDU/CSU/FDP voted Heimat-
vertriebenen Entschließung. In return Polish Sejm reasserted Poland’s border with
Germany , although in actual fact the Bundestag did not mention collective territo-
rial claims at all. See: ’Nie Rzucim, Chetnie Sprzedam’ Rzeczpospolita, 1.6.98
’Polens Parlament Kritiesiert Entschließung des Bundestages’, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 4.7.98.
‘Oswiadczenie Sejmu w Sprawie Rezolucji Bundestagu’, Rzeczpospolita, 5.7.98
8  See: ‘Rozwazni i Romantyczni’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30.10.98. ‘Apel o Realizm’
Rzeczpospolita, 30.10.98.
9  See: Janusz A. Majcherek, Widmo Nowej Realpolitik, ‘Rzeczpospolita’, 3.11.98.Marcin Zaborowski
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than ever before. On the other hand, precisely because of this increased
intimacy, the potential scope for the emergence of conflicts between some
smaller economic and political agents is multiplying. There are three cru-
cial consequences of this process. First, it is hard to imagine that Ger-
many will back down from pressing for enlargement in which its admini-
stration has been so strongly involved and has subsequently adjusted itself
technically to deal with. Second, dealing with EU enlargement will in-
creasingly involve a larger number of agents in the dense network of
German and Polish economic and political systems which will make the
process more problematic. Third, Germany’s support for EU Enlarge-
ment will increasingly depend on the government’s successes and failures
in those areas of European policy which remain vital for the promotion of
its own interests.
This chapter will examine the bilateral dynamics of Polish-German rela-
tions, looking initially at the process of reconciling strategic objectives
and subsequently discussing the impact of domestic Polish and German
developments on the pace of EU Enlargement. The first part of the paper
addresses some key issues in Polish-German relations that led to the cur-
rent advanced stage of the process of EU Enlargement. The second part
concentrates on the importance of indigenous factors, namely party poli-
tics and bureaucratic arrangements, for the construction of German and
Polish policies on EU Enlargement. These domestic developments are
addressed in the context of other objectives of Germany’s European di-
plomacy. Finally, the conclusion provides summary remarks and a brief
discussion on Polish policy during EU Enlargement negotiations.
1. Polish-German Relations and
Strategic Foreign Policy Objectives
There has always been a strong connection between Germany’s and Po-
land’s broader geopolitical aspirations and the condition of their bilateral
relations. Due to their geographical closeness and shared experience of
being a nation at the centre of the continent, Polish and German strategicPoland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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foreign policy objectives have never been indifferent to each other. In fact
for most of the modern age both nations believed that what they saw as
their ‘national interests’ were mutually exclusive.
10 And it was not until
the end of the Second World War that this perception slowly began to
change, first in West Germany
11 and subsequently, under much more re-
strained conditions, in Poland.
12
Under the dominating overlay of Cold War bipolarity there was a gradual
realisation on behalf of the West German and Polish political elites that a
number of their interests were in fact agreeable with each other. These
included most prominently peace and stabilisation in Central Europe and
decreasing both countries' dependence upon their respective patrons.
Also, although Polish Communists remained dogmatically opposed to
German unification,
13 a part of the pro-democratic opposition in Poland
held an opposing view based on the assumption that German unification
and the end of Communism were closely interrelated.
14
Bilateral ‘normalisation’ in the 1970s; West Germany’s temporary recog-
nition of the Oder-Neisse border and Polish consent for the departure of
10  Stanislaw Stoma, Czy Fatalism Wrogosci, Refleksje o Stosunkach Polsko-
Niemieckich 1871-1933, Znak: Krakow 1980. Jan Jozef Lipski, 'Dwie Ojczyzny-
Dwa Patriotyzmy. Uwagi o Megalomanii Narodowej i Ksenofobii Polakow', in:
Powiedziec Sobie wszystko, Eseje o Sasiedztwie Polsko-Niemieckim, Wy-
dawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie, Warszawa 1996.
11  For an analysis of impact of the Second World War upon West Germany's foreign
policy see: Bertel Heurlin, Germany in the Nineties, Macmillan Press, 1996.
12  ‘Udzielamy przebaczenia i prosimy o nie’ See: ‘Oredzie biskupow polskich do
biskupow niemieckich’, Materialy i Dokumenty, Warszawa 1966. Jan Jozef Lips-
ki, ibid. ‘Niemcy a Polska’, Kultura, No 370/371. ‘Polen und Deutschland’,
Osteeuropa, No 2 (Februar 1979). Krystyna Kersten, (Jan Bujnowski) ‘Przesied-
lenie Niemcow’,Veto, nr 16/1988. K. Wolicki (Timur), ‘Niemcy’, Krytyka, 1989
,z.5.
13  See: Jadwiga Kiwerska. ‘W Atmosferze Wrogosci’ in: Anna Wolff-Poweska ,eds,
Polacy Wobec Niemcow. Z Dzejow Kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989,
Instytut Zachodni, Poznan 1993.
14  See: ‘Niemcy a Polska’, Kultura, No 370/371. ‘Polen und Deutschland’, Osteuro-
pa, No 2 (Februar 1979).Marcin Zaborowski
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ethnic Germans from Poland, had a mutually positive outcome. On the
one hand it resulted in lessening Poland’s economic dependency on the
Soviet Union,
15 and on the other hand it constituted a vital step in West
Germany’s advocacy of détente and the subsequent enhancement of its
security. The additional bonus for the Federal Republic was its growing
prestige in the Western bloc and the realisation of its key importance for
the resolution of the East-West conflict.
16
However, by the 1980s it became apparent that West Germany’s Ostpoli-
tik was in deadlock and that it would not be able to be overcome without a
fundamental change in the structure of international relations.
17 This op-
portunity was created by the ending of the Cold War, through which a
number of bilateral Polish-German developments took place. Soon after
the completion of the German unification process, the border dispute was
finally unravelled and both countries signed the treaty on ‘Good Neigh-
bourliness’ in which Germany committed itself to supporting Poland’s EU
membership.
18 Also, the non-communist government of Poland saw the
unification of Germany as an obvious precondition for Poland’s integra-
tion with the West, hence its undisputed support for the process as well as
for the continuation of Germany’s NATO membership.
19
15  For an analysis of the policy of Polish Communists towards the FRG between
1970-1989 see: Bogdan Koszel, ‘Miedzy Dogmatyzmem a Pragmatyzmem’ in:
Anna Wolf-Poweska, ibid.
16  On Germany’s Ostpolitik see: Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Mitteleuropa?’ Daedalus,
Vo.119, No.1, Winter 1990. Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Germany’s Choice’, Foreign
Affairs, 73, 1994, pp 65-81. Jörg Brechtefeld, Mitteleuropa and German Politics:
1848 to the Present, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996. Adrian Hyde-Price, European
Security Beyond The Cold War, Four Scenarios for the year 2010, Royal Institute
for International Affairs 1991, pp 141-162.
17  ibid.
18  See: H.A. Jackobsen, M.Tomala, ibid. Jan Barcz , Mieczyslaw Tomala, ibid.
19  See: Horst Teltschik, 329 Dni - Zjednoczenie Niemiec w Zapiskach Doradcy
Kanclerza, Oficyna Panda, Warszawa 1992. German original: 329 Tage. Innenan-
sichten der Einheit, Wolf Jobs Siedler Verlag GnbH, Berlin: 1991.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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Since 1990, Germany has refrained from pursuing a unilateral policy to-
wards Poland and other East Central European countries; instead it has
continuously underpinned the idea of extending West European structures
to the East. In fact it is largely due to the consistent efforts of German
diplomacy that the issue of EU Enlargement appeared at the top of the
EU’s agenda and that recently the accession process has entered the stage
of negotiation.
Currently, developments in Polish-German relations are almost com-
pletely focused on the issue of EU and NATO enlargements. Poland will
continue to expect from Germany that it will persist in advocating Po-
land’s Western integration. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that Germany
may dramatically alter its policy and start to argue against Poland’s mem-
bership in the European Union. Therefore, the post-1990 Polish-German
‘Community of Interests’ or in other words ‘Community of strategic for-
eign policy objectives’ will continue to develop. In fact, it is currently
stretching beyond bilateral relations to the East, where both Poland and
Germany share an interest in making sure that concluding Poland’s West-
ern integration will not alienate other East Central European countries
which are not included in the same process.
On the other hand, as the relationship is growing more intimate, some
differences in emphasis are beginning to emerge. These mostly concern
the desirable timetable for completing Poland’s EU membership and some
internal EU developments, most prominently within the area of Common
Foreign and Security Policy. On several occasions, the new German gov-
ernment made it clear that it intends to slow down the pace of integrating
East Central Europe with the EU.
20 This resulted in turn in more skeptical
assessments of Germany’s foreign policy by some members of the Polish
government as well as worsening public attitudes in Poland towards Ger-
20  See:‘Wolniej do Unii’ Zycie, 29.10.98. ‘Bez Zludzen w Sprawie Poszerzenia’
Rzeczpospolita, 29.10.98Marcin Zaborowski
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many.
21 Also, Germany’s policy of strengthening the European dimension
of international security has been less-than-welcomed in Poland.
22 Faced
with a choice between the European or Atlantic dimension of security
provision, it is unlikely that Poland may in the near future prefer the for-
mer, at least as long as it remains outside the EU. In fact, the critical re-
actions in Poland to the proposal by German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fisher, to cancel NATO’s first nuclear strike option, may mark the be-
ginning of a longer discrepancy in Polish and German perceptions of se-
curity and security institutions.
23
Considering the long-term strategic foreign policy objective of the Federal
Republic to work towards an ‘ever closer’ Europe, it is crucial for the
continuity of Germany’s support for expanding the EU that this notion
does not undermine the Community’s internal cohesion. The Polish gov-
ernment appears to be well aware that it is in its best interest to pursue a
double and simultaneous development of the European Union. The chief
negotiator of Poland’s EU membership - Mr Kulakowski, often underlines
that the notions of opening the EU to the East and its deepening are mutu-
ally complementary.
24 On the other hand, some Polish political parties
seem to opt for a looser model of European integration.
25 Should these
21  See: Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, Die Woche,
28.10.98. Also: ‘Geremek: Nie Wiemy, Czego Oczekiwac’ Gazeta Wyborcza ,
29. 10. 98. For an impact of these developemnts on the public opinion in Poland
see: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.
22  See: Bartosz Jalowiecki, Stare czy Nowe NATO, ‘Zycie’, 8.6.98.
23  ‘Atomowa Wpadka’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 25.11.98. ‘Uslyszec Nasz Glos’, ibid.
‘Polen will auf den Atomschirm der NATO nicht verzichten’ Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 7.12.98.
24  Jan Kulakowski, 'Polityka Polski wobec Unii Europejskiej', in: Rocznik Polskiej
Polityki Zagranicznej, Warszawa 1997. Jan Kulakowski, 'Obrona Polskich Intere-
sow przy Szukaniu Komporomisow z UE', Przeglad Srodkowo-
Europejski/Central European Review, 23, 1998.
25  For an analysis of the attitude of Polish political parties towards the notion of Eu-
ropean Integration see: Jerzy Hausner, 'Partie wobec Integracji', in: Przystapienie
czy Integracja? EU-Mnitoring II, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warszawa, MarzecPoland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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voices become more powerful, Germany may be forced to rethink its sup-
port for Poland’s EU membership.
However, in spite of these disagreements, it seems apparent that Poland
and Germany have come a long way since reconciling their strategic dif-
ferences. It is also clear that the question of integrating Poland with the
European Union remains of key importance for the condition of this rela-
tionship. The emergence of some differences of opinion in security ori-
entations, however important, are part of the wider Euro-Atlantic security
debate, and are therefore unlikely to endanger the fundaments of post-
1990 Polish-German rapprochement. In fact, the appearance of such a
debate proves the current intensity of the relationship.
In order to address the current developments in Polish-German relations
in the context of EU enlargement toward the East, it does not seem suffi-
cient any longer to keep discussing strategic issues of high politics which
may diverge in some details, but will more or less remain congruent.
Since the start of the actual process of negotiating Poland’s accession to
the European Union, it has become apparent that the usual dynamics of
European integration, marked by the ever-greater involvement of a larger
number of agents, are playing an increasingly prominent role in this rela-
tionship. In other words, foreign policy strategic considerations may
prove to be of limited impact for the present stage of Polish-German rela-
tions. Therefore, in order to analyse these current developments in the
context of EU enlargement negotiations, which is predominantly a techni-
cal process, it is necessary to focus on the domestic scenes. Crucially,
two indigenous factors need to be addressed: the economic and political
considerations and factors that influence German and Polish interest for-
mation in this process and the decision-making patterns of German and
Polish European diplomacy.
1998. Polacy wobec Integracji Europejskiej, Centrum Stosunkow Miedzynaro-
dowych, Warszawa 1998.Marcin Zaborowski
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2. EU Enlargement Negotiations and the
European Diplomacy of Poland and Germany
The overall nature of processing and conducting European diplomacy has
increasingly become considered to be an internal rather than foreign af-
fair. The amended Article 23 of the German Basic Law has in fact for-
mally introduced the concept of domestic European policy including ex-
tensive constitutional rights for the German Länder to participate in the
decision-making process.
26 Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber, ar-
gued that European policy should be exclusively considered an internal
rather than foreign policy, and that consequently it should remain outside
the competencies of the Auswärtiges Amt. In Poland, where European in-
tegration is increasingly affecting some individual sectors of industry, the
government is often targeted by industrial lobbying. This in turn has
prompted some departments, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture, to
speak independently of the government’s official line.
27 In addition, after
the 1998 administrative reform, the competencies of the Polish regions
have significantly increased and their greater involvement in the European
process should be expected, too.
On the whole, in order to analyse German and Polish European diplo-
macy in the process of preparing positions for the EU enlargement nego-
tiations, three current domestic factors need to be addressed: the bureau-
cratic decision making process, party politics and regional interests (the
latter will not be discussed here due to the limited remit of this paper).
 28
26  See: Charlie Jeffery, A Giant with Feet of Clay? United Germany in the European
Union, Discussion Papers in German Studies No. IGS95/6 Institute for German
Studies, University of Birmingham.
27  Klaus Bachmann, Czy Polska Druzyna Umie Grac w Pilke, ‘Rzeczpospolita’
10.6.98.
28  For an analysis of Germany’s European Diplomacy see: Simon Bulmer and Wil-
liam Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community,
London: Allan and Unwin, 1987. Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels, The
European Union and Member States, Manchester University Press, 1996. DietrichPoland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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However, it is also important to see that as far as Germany is concerned,
enlarging the EU to the East is just a part of its overall European diplo-
macy. This implies that after the complex process of constructing a do-
mestic consensus, Germany’s position on EU enlargement is also con-
fronted with other objectives in European policy.
EU Enlargement and ‘Other’ Objectives in European Diplomacy
The outcome of the 1998 elections to the Bundestag marked a change in
Germany’s conduct of European policy. The new, more economically fo-
cused government, has particularly supported the three following devel-
opments.
29
1. Reform of the system of financing the EU in a way that would ensure
lower German contributions to the EU’s budget and secure a ‘fairer’ allo-
cation of resources.
30
2. The development of and further synchronisation of employment poli-
cies. To tackle rising unemployment through the creation of state-
sponsored jobs and equalisation of labour costs across the EU.
3. Harmonisation of corporate taxes in EU Member States.
31
In the period since the new administration has been in office it has be-
come clear that Germany’s pressure to carry out these policies has con-
siderably affected the EU’s readiness to admit new members. Although
Rometsch, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union, Discussi-
on Papers in German Studies No. IGS95/2 Institute for German Studies, Univer-
sity of Birmingham.
29  See the coalition agreement between the SPD and Alliance 90/Greens. The docu-
ments addresses directly first two of the above mentioned policy objectives.
30  See: Der Streit über die Reform der Europäischen Union hält an’ Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 7.12.98 ‘Schröder fordert niedrigere deutsche Zahlungen an die
EU’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9.12.98. ‘Europe’s Spoils Up for Grabs’
Financial Times, 14.12.98.
31 ‘Germany to Push Ahead with EU Tax Harmonising Plans’ Financial Times,
24.11.98.Marcin Zaborowski
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calling for budget reform was in fact initiated by the former coalition,
32
the new government has pronounced its priorities more assertively and in
a way that antagonised some other members of the Community.
33 Also,
the new administration directly linked finance reform with the Eastern
expansion, declaring a policy of Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzre-
form (No enlargement without financial reform).
34 The second policy ob-
jective, the development of employment policy, does not easily reconcile
with extending the free movement of workers to the countries where the
costs of labour units are considerably cheaper than in Germany. Finally,
the third postulate to harmonise corporate taxes all over the EU antago-
nised the United Kingdom, the chief advocate of EU Enlargement outside
Germany.
35 This may potentially lead to another sidelining of Britain and
the return of a non-cooperative style of European policy - a development
which would certainly delay the pace of enlargement.
36
Some declarations of the Polish Government regarding the preferred
model of acceding to the EU contradict some of the newly declared policy
objectives of Germany’s European diplomacy. For example, the argument
of the Polish Minister of Agriculture against the proposed reforms of the
Common Agricultural Policy in Agenda 2000, serves to strengthen the
calls for no reform in the financing of the EU.
37 A second point is the
government’s opposition to the introduction of transition periods on the
32 See: ‘Auditors Challenge Budget Rebate Call’, European Voice, 11-17 June,
1998. ‘Sein Oder Nicht Sein’, Der Spiegel, 18.5. 1998.
33  ‘EU North and South Split on Spending Freeze’ Financial Times, 7.12.98
34  See: ‘Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform’ Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 3.12.98.
35  ‘Britain. Out of Harmony Again’, The Economist, 28 November 1998. ‘Tax De-
bate Storms Out from the Margins’ Financial Times, 9.12,98.
36  For the analysis of Britain’s European policy see: Stephen George’, An Awkward
Partner. Britain in the European Community, Oxford: 1990.
37  See: Klaus Bachmann, ibid. For details of the proposed reform of the CAP see:
‘Agenda 2000-For Stronger and Larger Union’, Bulletin der Europäischen Union
Beilage 5/97, pp. 27-36. The Week in Europe, The European Commission, 19
March 1998.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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free movement of labour which complicates Germany’s postulate to har-
monise the EU’s employment policy.
38
On the whole, the policy prioritisation of the new German administration
outlined above complements the long term objective of all German Gov-
ernments - to enhance and deepen European integration.
39 However, the
era when the Federal Republic was ready to make more material sacri-
fices than any other member state in order to achieve this priority has
gone. The notion of EU Enlargement, although remaining high among
Germany’s policy objectives, is unlikely to be fully supported as long as
at least some of the policy reforms mentioned above are undertaken.
Ironically, the current position of Poland to become a full member of the
Union with as little and as short transition periods as necessary (with the
exception of environmental policy and land purchasing) may at the mo-
ment delay Germany’s readiness to uphold Poland’s EU membership.
However, both German and Polish domestic constraints make it difficult
for their governments to alter their declared European policies in a way
that would speed up the enlargement process. Also the shape of current
political debates in both countries as well as some developments in ad-
ministrating the EU enlargement process by the German and Polish civil
service seem to confirm this observation.
38  For the German discussion about the Polish position on the extension of the free
movement of labour see: ‘Warschau will Anfang an Vollwertiges EU Mitglied
Sein’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Donnerstag 26 Februar 1998. Nr.48.
39  For an elaboration on the importance of European integration for the Federal Re-
public of Germany’s see: Simon Bulmer and William Paterson , West Germany’s
Role in Europe: ‘Man-Mountain’ or ‘Semi-Guliver’?, Journal of Common Market
Studies, XXVIII (1989), pp. 95-117. Peter J.Katzenstein, 'United Germany in an
Integrating Europe', in: Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.) Tamed Power, Germany in
Europe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1997. Simon J. Bulmer,
'Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German
Power', in: Peter J. Katzenstein, ibid.Marcin Zaborowski
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Political Parties
The key features of German and Polish politics are in fact strikingly
similar to each other. Due to their electoral laws - proportional represen-
tation with a five percent threshold - politics in both countries are domi-
nated by a centrist orientation and a system of coalition governments. The
political struggle between coalition partners and the potential for a change
of government through a switch of partner, result in similar conse-
quences. In both cases the electoral constitutions stimulate the elimination
of radical tendencies and nurture a more consensual style of politics. Cur-
rently it is the junior partners in Polish and German governments that
hold the departments of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, in some ways the im-
pact of domestic politics upon the conduct of Polish and German Euro-
pean diplomacy is structurally comparable.
As far as the positions of individual Polish and German parties on Po-
land’s membership in the EU are concerned, there is a cross-party con-
sensus in both countries to support this strategic foreign policy objec-
tive.
40 The idea of expanding the EU eastwards has in fact never become
a matter of political discussion between the opposition and a government,
certainly not in a way that would clearly identify that one party is princi-
pally against the notion.
In fact, in Germany under the former CDU/CSU-FDP coalition
41, the
SPD and the Greens attacked the government for displaying skepticism in
the enlargement area.
42 Currently, the roles have been reversed, so that
40  See: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.
41  For a scepticism in the EU Enlargement area of the CSU and some parts of the
CDU see: ‘CSU warnt erneut vor überstürzten Beitritten’, Süddeutsche Zeitung,
12.05.1998. ‘Für den EU-Beitritt Tschechiens’ Focus, 1.6.98. ‘Do UE Po Uzna-
niu Roszczen’, Rzeczpospolita , 1.6.98. ‘Wahlkampf im Parliament’, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 19.6.1998. ‘100 Dni Przed Wyborami’ Rzeczpospolita, 19.6.98. ‘Ver-
triebene ‘nicht auf dem Sprung’. Steinbach: Polen ist nicht EU-reif’, TAZ, Nr.
5576 vom 08.07.1998 Seite 5 Aktuelles.
42  ‘Polska Nie Lezy Miedzy Niemcami a Francja. Rozmowa z Günterem Verheuge-
nem, Ekspertem SPD’, Rzeczpospolita, 1.7.98. ‘Niefortunna Rezolucja. Verheu-Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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the red-green coalition is criticised for slowing down the process. It is
therefore clear that the notion of EU Enlargement has become part of the
German European ‘philosophy’ which normally remains unchallenged by
the opposition.
43 This restraint in abusing an anti-enlargement argument is
particularly remarkable considering the reluctance of the German general
public to underpin Poland’s EU membership.
44 In Poland, some Euro-
skepticism has been displayed on the right of the governing AWS as well
as in the opposition PSL.
45 Therefore, as in the German case, the actual
debate continues to be held outside the main lines of political division
within, and not between the government and opposition.
Both German and Polish junior coalition parties (the UW and the Greens)
present significantly more pro-European positions than their senior coun-
terparts.
46 The Greens and the UW also see issues of European diplomacy
as constituting their electoral assets and address them accordingly in order
to further their domestic popularity. These generally Euro-friendly atti-
tudes of the junior parties also have some impact upon their policies to-
wards the ‘difficult areas’ of EU enlargement. It is apparent that the
Greens present a more consensual approach than the SPD and that the
UW is easier to negotiate with than the AWS. For example, in the area of
the free movement of labour, Germany’s Green Foreign Minister takes a
more relaxed position than the Chancellor.
47 The liberal UW is less asser-
tive on the issue of land buying in Poland than the more traditional AWS.
gen: Po Zwyciestwie SPD Bedzie Inaczej’ Rzeczpospolita, 7.7.98. ‘Gerhard
Schröder w Warszawie. Nie Stawiajmy Warunkow’ Rzeczpospolita, 18.6.98.
43  See: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.
44  30% of German general public is in favour and 52 % against Poland’s EU mem-
bership. See: Eurobarometer, 47, Spring 1997, Annex B.20.
45  See: Jerzy Hausner, ibid. Polacy wobec Integracji Europejskiej, ibid.
46  For a position on Europe by the Polish UW see: Jerzy Hausner, ibid. For policy
statements in the European area by Joshka Fisher (leader of Alliance 90/Greens)
see: ‘Perspektywy Rozwoju Europy w Przeszlosci’ Problemy Miedzynarodowe,
nr.3.1997. ‘Ein Realo sicht die Welt’ Die Zeit, 12 November 1998.
47  See: ‘Gespräch mit Joschka Fischer über das Koalitionsklima und die Außen - und
Sicherheitpolitik’ Der Spiegel, Nr. 48/23.11.98.Marcin Zaborowski
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However, the crucial elements of German and Polish positions on EU
Enlargement negotiations may in fact depend more upon internal power
struggles within both senior parties in government. These ‘in-house’ dis-
putes are also more difficult to verify, since they are not directed to the
general public and have little or no vote-winning power. Both the German
SPD and the Polish AWS remain lacking in strong and coherent leader-
ship. Although in the Polish case this problem is far more profound, since
the AWS is not a party in the traditional sense but a loose centre-right al-
liance put together by the trade union ‘Solidarity’. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the powers of the Polish as well as the German leaders in Govern-
ment remain significantly constrained by the internal politics of their par-
ties. In both cases, the issues of European integration constitute a vital
element of a struggle within the AWS as well as inside the SPD.
In Poland, issues of European integration continue to raise controversies
within the governing AWS.
48 Although Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek holds
a moderate position,
49 there are strong tendencies within the party to play
hard with the European Union and not to give up on ‘Polish national in-
terests’, unless this is absolutely necessary. The EU Enlargement nego-
tiations are often portrayed in Poland as a zero-sum game.
 50 Conse-
quently, the willingness to compromise during the accession talks remains
low within the AWS. Also, the fact that the Minister of Agriculture from
the AWS is politically engaged in attracting the votes of farmers may
prove to have some impact upon the government’s position on Agenda
2000.
51
On the whole, party politics in Germany and in Poland do not address the
principle of EU Enlargement which remains generally accepted. On the
other hand, due to recent advances, the process of integrating Poland with
48  See: ‘To zly Minister’, Rzeczpospolita, 22.7.98.
49  Jerzy Buzek, Poland’s Future in a United Europe, ZEI - Discussion Paper
C6/1998. ‘Data Bardzo Potrzebna’, Rzeczpospolita, 8.6.98.
50 See: Klaus Bachmann, ibid.
51  ibid.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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the EU is increasingly dependent upon developments in other areas of
European policy, such as budget reform or employment policy. These
issues constitute a crucial part of Germany’s domestic debate. Therefore,
any political developments in constructing Germany’s policy in these ar-
eas will continue to affect the EU enlargement process and consequently
Polish-German relations.
The Civil Service
The German and Polish structures of administrating European diplomacy
appear considerably decentralised. The Federal Republic’s constitutional
provisions prompted relative autonomy for the individual branches of
government and they have established the federal system of governance as
well.
52 In Poland the key decision-making competencies in European af-
fairs are divided between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Of-
fice. Also, due to the recent administrative reform, the role of the re-
gional dimension will grow. However, the crucial features of Germany’s
and Poland’s European diplomacy are to a lesser extent determined by
constitutional rules than by political developments.
Germany: Under the former German administration the EU enlargement
decision-making process was formally co-ordinated in the Foreign Office
and the Economics Ministry in specially established task-force groups
(Arbeitstäbe). Informally, in spite of the lack of an exclusive European
Affairs division, the Chancellor’s Office claimed to hold key co-
ordinating functions in all European issues, including enlargement. On the
whole, it was clear that due to the relative weakness of the Ministry of
Economics, the key powers in the sphere remained in the Foreign Office,
with some degree of guidance from the Chancellor’s Office. This system
confirmed the importance of strategic foreign policy considerations in
handling the EU enlargement process. It also contributed to the establish-Marcin Zaborowski
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ment of widespread support for the notion apparent among the German
political class.
53
The recent change of government as well as the development of EU en-
largement negotiations marked some considerable reorganisation in the
decision-making process. The European department of the Economics
Ministry, including a task-force for enlargement, has been moved to the
Finance Ministry. Also a special European Affairs unit is being created in
the Chancellor’s office with Mr. Silberberg (who previously led the EU
enlargement task-force in the Foreign Office) appointed as its chief ex-
ecutive. Although the Auswärtiges Amt has not been formally stripped of
any competencies, it is clear that taking over European Affairs by the
strong Finance Ministry may increase the potential for internal competi-
tion. The strengthening of the Finance Ministry’s position in European
Affairs also signifies a change in Germany’s EU enlargement policy. The
importance of the Foreign Office in the process has been additionally un-
dermined by the decision issued by the Chancellor’s Office concerning the
division of competencies in this area.
54 Although, according to this docu-
ment the Auswärtiges Amt remains a chief co-ordinating body as far as
EU expansion is concerned, the Finance Ministry will take the lead when
the economic and financial issues are raised during the accession talks.
55
The Foreign Office, traditionally concerned with Germany’s strategic
aims and objectives, pushed in the past for a quick enlargement with rela-
tively little regard for the immediate costs of the operation. The Finance
Ministry aided by the Chancellor’s Office will object to any move that
might increase Germany’s EU budgetary contributions or endanger its
labour market. EU enlargement is perrceived at the moment as compro-
52  For an argument about the structure of Germany’s European diplomacy see: Si-
mon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, William E.Paterson, Germany’s European Diplo-
macy: Shaping the Regional Milieu, Bertelsmann Wissenschaftsstiftung, 1997.
53  See: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.
54  November 1998 - Schreiben von Dr. Frank Streist, Kanzleramt.
55  ibid.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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mising these other objectives, hence its secondary importance for the cur-
rent government.
Poland: In Poland, the process of constructing European diplomacy is
principally divided between the Foreign Office (FO) and the Office of the
Council of Ministers (OCM), each of them run by different political par-
ties. In addition the unit that negotiates Poland’s EU accession was set up
outside of the Office of the Committee of European Integration (OCEI),
although both these divisions are parts of the OCM. In theory the division
of labour is clear cut. The Foreign Office prepares policy guidelines and
looks at bilateral issues of EU Enlargement. The OCEI turns the policy
guidelines into policy directives and co-ordinates the work of other Min-
istries. Finally the Negotiating Team negotiates Poland’s EU accession
with Brussels. However, in practise there is a lot of policy overlap be-
tween and within these key departments and a fair amount of politically
driven competition.
The OCEI, which belongs to the OCM, was established as a counterbal-
ance to the FO, run in the past by presidential nominees. The appointment
of the head of the negotiating team, Mr Kulakowski, counterbalanced the
nomination of Mr. Czarnecki (a mild Euroskeptic from the AWS-ZChN)
who formerly ran in the OCEI.
56 Finally, the personal conflict even oc-
curred within the OCEI between Minister Czarnecki and his deputy from
the UW.
57
This potentially conflictual setting and subsequent problems of poor co-
ordination was probably one of the reasons contributing to the loss of 34
million ECU from Poland’s share of the PHARE programme
58 - a deci-
sion which was formally justified by the incompetence of the projects
prepared by the Polish side. As an effect of the political crisis prompted
56  For views of former Minister Czarnecki on Poland’s role in the EU see: ‘Rozmo-
wa z Ryszardem Czarneckim’ Rzeczpospolita, 5.11.97.
57  See: ‘Klotnia Ministrow’, Rzeczpospolita, 7.7.98.Marcin Zaborowski
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by the EU’s decision, the running of Poland’s European Affairs was par-
tially de-politicised; Minister Czarnecki was sacked and the OCEI was
taken over by a ‘non-political’ Secretary of State responsible directly to
the Prime Minister.
Providing that the latter development remains a permanent practice it will
probably smooth the decision-making process in the running of European
Affairs by the Polish government.
59 However, it is still apparent that party
politics remains to have a considerable impact upon the process of con-
structing Poland’s European policy.
60 This persistence of a direct link
between politics and the civil service affects the latter’s ability to create a
long-term European strategy open to short-term compromise in less im-
portant aspects. Consequently, it affects Poland’s readiness to accommo-
date some of the objectives of Germany’s European diplomacy, a motion
possibly speeding up the EU enlargement process.
3. Conclusion
To sum up, it is clear that the most prominent feature of the Polish-
German ‘Community of Interests’ has been to integrate Poland with the
West. For Germany, EU and NATO enlargements to the East represent a
stabilisation of its external environment therefore an improvement of its
own security. For Poland, it is the end of the experience of a ‘land in
between’ that undermined nationhood in the past. It is therefore clear that
there are ‘hard interests’ on both sides that are crucial for explaining
German-Polish rapprochement. At the same time, it is important to see
that matters of self-interest or external factors do not provide all answers
to explain the current state of the relationship.
58  See: ‘Polska traci 34 Miliony ECU’, Rzeczpospolita, 26.5.98. ‘Polen will WU-
Gelder besser verwalten’ Focus, 2.6.98.
59  A recent departure of a non-political civil servant Ms. Fendler who headed the
OCEI, reopened the way for a squabble among Poland’s centre-right coalition for
the post. See: 'Reforms Face Political Turmoil', Financial Times, 21.12.98.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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Two other issues need to be addressed here. First, EU membership has
far more profound implications than belonging to a security alliance. It
has an impact upon industry, politics and the culture of the member state.
It affects the everyday life of individuals and sense of their identity. Also,
the EU gathers countries ruled by elected liberal-democratic regimes.
Therefore in order to explain the post-1990 closeness between Germany
and Poland aspiring for EU membership, it is necessary to look into a
number of domestic developments such as the process of democratisation
and changing political culture. In other words, the Polish-German ‘Com-
munity of Interests’ can be equally referred to as a ‘Community of Val-
ues’ of two democratic states.
Second, precisely because of the fact that both Poland and Germany have
democratically elected regimes, their mutual relationship in such a com-
plex process as European integration (that itself often resembles domestic
bargaining) is addressed by a number of political and economic agents
which bring to the process their own particular interests. Therefore, in
spite of the existing congruence of strategic foreign policy objectives, a
fair amount of disagreement will continue to occur between the Polish and
German participants in the EU enlargement negotiating process.
The recent change in Germany’s European diplomacy has already affected
the pace of EU enlargement. As argued before, it is unlikely that the cur-
rent government will continue to press for Poland’s EU membership un-
less it is satisfied with the progress in other areas of European policy.
This does not necessarily mean that the process of completing Poland’s
EU accession will be delayed, nor that the Polish government has nothing
left to do but keep referring to historical arguments. There are a number
of strategies that can be possibly undertaken by the Polish side in order to
speed up the accession negotiations and enter the EU on favourable terms
and conditions.
60  See: ‘To Zly Minister’, ibid.Marcin Zaborowski
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The Polish government should clearly and fully support the development
of the European Union as it is envisaged in Agenda 2000. It should not
complain that this document creates double standards for the agricultural
sectors of future members. Indeed, it is difficult to see a credible reason
why the Polish agricultural sector that employs a forth of the labour force
while producing only 6% of GDP should be encouraged to expand.
61
It is also possible, although probably not necessary nor advisable, that the
Polish side can voluntarily declare a trade-off proposed by the American
economist Jeffrey Sachs.
62 According to this proposal, Poland would vol-
untarily resign from participating in some of the EU’s aid programmes as
well as from having unrestricted access to the EU’s labour market. In ex-
change, Poland would not have to apply the Community’s environmental
standards and some branches of the Polish industry would remain pro-
tected. In fact, the Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, declared recently that in
order to speed up the enlargement process, Poland does need to join all
EU’s promotion and development programmes.
63
However, most importantly, Poland should constructively participate in a
discussion about the future of the EU. This may be also connected with
outlining and arguing in defence of these specific interests, values and
institutions which the Polish side considers vital for the protection of its
own identity. As it was suggested by the Polish former ambassador to
Germany, Janusz Reiter, the best forum for this kind of debate already
exists with the ‘Weimar Triangle’ formed by Germany, Poland and
France.
64 Such a development might simultaneously serve three purposes,
61  See: ‘The Future for Farming’ Business Central Europe, May 1998.
62  See: Bogdan W.Mach, Historyczne Nadzieje i Przyziemne Dylematy: Dylematy
Polskiego Uczestnictwa w Unii Europejskiej, in: 'Polacy wobec Integracji Polski z
Unia Europejska', Centrum Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych, Warszawa 1998.
63  See: Aleksander Smolar, Unia na Horyzoncie, ‘Rzeczpospolita’, 19-20.12.98.
64  Janusz Reiter, 'Refleksje na Temat Stosunkow Polsko-Niemieckich', in: Rocznik
Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej, Warszawa 1997. For an extensive analysis of the
‘Weimar Co-operation’ and a collection of relevant documents see: Przeglad
Srodkowo-Europejski/Central European Review, 20-21, 1998.Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
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it may improve the process of European unification, enhance Polish-
German relations and finally it should serve well the overall notion of
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